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The Possible Impact of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms on Administrative Law 
Andrew J. ROMAN * 
Bien que la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés ait généré dans un 
premier temps surtout de la jurisprudence criminelle, il est à prévoir qu'elle 
exercera aussi une influence considérable sur le droit administratif. Elle ne 
changera pas beaucoup le droit relatif au contrôle judiciaire de l'Administration, 
mais par rapport à un droit administratif conçu plus largement il ne fait pas de 
doute qu'elle va produire des effets substantiels. 
Le présent article a pour objet principal l'article 8 de la Charte, qui 
protège contre les fouilles, perquisitions et saisies abusives. Il analyse cette 
disposition en référant à des situations spécifiques en matière d'impôt, de 
monopoles, d'immigration, de douanes et a"étiquetage. 
L'auteur en arrive à la conclusion que la Charte a d'une certaine façon 
constitutionnalisé la pratique et les procédures administratives. L'administration 
ne doit désormais exercer que les pouvoirs qui sont absolument nécessaires pour 
s'acquitter des tâches que lui confie le parlement. Les mécanismes de mise en 
œuvre des lois doivent d'autre part être conçus en fonction de situations 
normales et non pas en fonction des pires hypothèses. 
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Introduction 
It is rather difficult, at this early stage, to offer any firm conclusions as 
to the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on adminis-
trative law. The early Charter decisions have tended to be in the criminal law 
area, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Also, section 15 of the Charter 
only came into force on April 17, 1985. It is expected to have a major 
impact on administrative law. And, as yet, very few Charter cases have 
reached the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Despite a strong temptation to speculate as to the probable fate of 
various laws or administrative practices in the Supreme Court of Canada, I 
have heeded the quiet internal voice of self-restraint which reminds me that 
he who lives by the crystal ball must be prepared to eat ground glass. 
In the conventional perception of administrative law shared by most 
private law lawyers and, unfortunately, some of the more old-fashioned law 
schools, administrative law equals judicial review. In that narrow context, 
the Charter will have very little impact. For example, an applicant for 
mandamus will still have to convince the court that a legal duty is owed to 
him, regardless of the Charter ; similarly, someone bringing an action for the 
currently fashionable remedy of declaration must still show that some legally 
recognized right or interest of his is affected. Fundamental concepts of 
standing and justiciability are unaffected by the Charter but administrative 
law is much broader than judicial review. It covers, in its broadest aspects, 
virtually all of the relationships between the citizen and the state and, at the 
very least, the administration of government, whether by a board, commission 
or tribunal, by a department, or even the Cabinet itself. 
At its boundaries, administrative law overlaps with constitutional law. 
Both deal with the legal structure within which our system of government 
operates and both are preoccupied with the use and abuse of public power. 
Also, both are concerned with the allocation of government functions and 
powers among public authorities and officials, and with the procedures they 
employ in making decisions. In other words, constitutional law and adminis-
trative law provide the general principles of public law for conduct of the 
various aspects of the business of government '. The Charter, of course, is a 
constitutional document. Its entrenchment has broadened the constitutional 
bases upon which the courts may review the action of the administration, at 
every level of government. 
1. Fora fuller discussion of this question, see Traité de Droit administratif (Deuxième édition), 
R. Dussault, L. Borgeat, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1984 and the second 
edition of Administrative Law, Cases, Texts and Materials, by J.M. EVANS, H.N. JANISCH, 
D.J. MULLAN, R.C.B. RISK, Edmond-Montgomery Publications, 1984, p. 14 to 16. 
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Apart from section 15, the section of the Charter most likely to affect 
administrative law is section 7, which states that a person has "the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". 
This section, regardless of how it is eventually interpreted, has the effect of 
"constitutionalizing" procedural issues which, although subjected by the 
courts to the limited constraint of the "fairness doctrine", were formerly 
mainly within the control of Parliament. The courts have now been given the 
role of final arbiter on the procedures that may be adopted by, for example, 
the CRTC, the Immigration Appeal Board, Revenue Canada, and virtually 
any departmental official who decides any matter affecting rights or 
interests, whether he is acting in a judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative 
capacity. 
Not all Charter issues will be determined by courts of law. The reference 
in section 24 to a "court of competent jurisdiction" is much broader, and has 
important implications, to be explained below. The passage of the Charter 
may be seen as both an expression of confidence in the courts and a 
willingness to accept the possibility that legislative supremacy is to give way 
to a balancing or harmony between the various organs of the state — 
legislature, executive and judiciary. Although the Charter cannot resuscitate 
the legislative branch, it can revitalize the judiciary's control of the executive 
in this "age of executive government". 
The provision of a new constitutional constraint on the operation of 
public authorities does not necessarily mean the administration will be 
forced into a judicial box. The early Charter cases at all levels of court have 
indicated substantial deference for the legitimate role of the executive. 
Nevertheless, the imposition of the Charter as the supreme law of the land 
does mean that the sources of Canadian administrative law have been 
substantially increased. The legality of bureaucratic conduct is now decided 
not only in accordance with fidelity to legislation, but also by the normative 
concepts contained in the Charter. 
In concluding this introduction, it should be mentioned that an 
interesting open question is the extent to which the Charter will affect the 
tortious liability of statutory authorities. Notwithstanding the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool case2, 
constraining liability for the tort of breach of statutory duty, our courts may 
view a breach of the Charter as a constitutional breach rather than a 
statutory violation, thereby constituting a tort giving a right to damages 
under section 24(1). For example, in Crossman v. The Queen1, a police 
2. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205. 
3. (1984) 9 D.L.R. (4th) 588 (F.C.T.D.). 
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officer's denial of the right of counsel to a person in custody, in violation of 
section 10(b) of the Charter, was held to constitute a tort for which damages 
might be awarded. Even though the plaintiff ultimately pleaded guilty, and 
even though there was no real damage, he was awarded punitive damages of 
$500 as an expression of the court's indignation that Charter rights had been 
violated. In the administrative law area, searches and seizures or other 
coercive administrative acts in contravention of the Charter may well result 
in real damages, creating liability of both a compensatory and a punitive 
character. 
1. The Scope of the Charter 
A widespread misconception, even among lawyers, is that the primary 
focus of the Charter is criminal law and that its principal application is the 
nullification of unconstitutional legislation. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Although criminal law applications of the Charter have been the 
most obvious and the plaintiffs in these cases the most desperate, once the 
handful of basic criminal law issues have been determined, the major 
preoccupation is likely to be administrative law. 
The terms of the Charter and our experience with the Canadian Bill of 
Rights make it clear that administrative action is also subject to review4. For 
example, section 15(2) indicates that the guarantee of equality under the law 
is not upset by "any law, program, or activity" which is an affirmative action 
program. This consideration of "program or activity" contemplates a 
broader conception of what exists "under the law" than merely statutes or 
other statutory instruments. Also, section 6(3)(a) mentions any "laws or 
practices" of general application in a province, while section 6(4) talks about 
a "law, program, or activity". Such language demonstrates that adminis-
trative action is subject to judicial review. 
Other sections of the Charter also seem to be directed to administrative 
action. For example, the legal rights sections dealing with unlawful search or 
seizure must, in order to have any meaning, apply to search or seizure by any 
government official, even if authorized by a statute or regulation. If we add 
to this the requirement of section 1 that the rights in the Charter are subject 
to such reasonable limits as are "prescribed by law", this would lead us to 
conclude that the bureaucratic activity of enforcement is subject to judicial 
review, even if authorized by law, unless the law itself is "reasonably 
necessary". 
4. For a fuller discussion of this, please see K. SWINTON, "Application of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s. 30, 31, 32)", in G.-A. BEAUDOIN and W.S. TARNOPOLSKY 
(ed.), The Canadian Charier of Rights and Freedoms, Toronto, Carswell, 1982, p. 52-53. 
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Even under the Bill of Rights, there was a well-established tradition of 
examination of administrative practices5. Outside of the criminal law field, 
the courts will, in all probability, apply the Charter in the same way. 
Professor Weiler has suggested that a charter of rights should most 
frequently be applied for this purpose6. 
Professor Swinton regards the most difficult issue of applicability of the 
Charter as : 
[...] how far down the chain of governmental activity will the Charter reach? ' 
There is little question that the Charter will apply to the actions of 
departmental officials in such matters as issuing regulations or approving 
and denying applications for licences or grants pursuant to statutes. This is 
because statutory discretion must be exercised in compliance with the 
Charter, and the regulations or statutes must themselves comply with the 
Charter. But how far beyond departmental activity should the Charter 
apply? At present, there is no jurisprudence providing a clear answer, 
although some general principle must be formulated if arbitrary decisions 
are to be avoided. Professor Swinton suggests that commissions like the 
CTC or CRTC should undoubtedly be subject to the Charter, although the 
CBC might better be left to regulation by the CRTC or the Canadian Human 
Rights Commission, as are other broadcasters when they violate discrim-
ination provisions. She recommends an express governmental function test : 
Is the subordinate agency exercising state authority in a way which can 
interfere with the individual right to freedom from unreasonable state 
action ? 
Whatever the test that is ultimately adopted, it would seem that no 
administrative action which can affect rights can automatically be assumed 
to be immune from Charter. 
2. Court of Competent Jurisdiction 
Section 24(1) states that anyone whose rights or freedoms have been 
infringed or denied may apply to a "court of competent jurisdiction" to 
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances. What is a court of competent jurisdiction ? 
In some cases the answer will be obvious ; in others, it will be a technical 
question of considerable complexity. There has already been some interesting 
5. See, for example, Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889, or Mitchell v. The Queen, [1976] 2 
S.C.R. 570. 
6. P. WEILER, In the Last Resort, Toronto, Carswell, 1974, p. 209. 
7. Supra, note 4, p. 53. 
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jurisprudence on the point. In Re Nash and The Queen 8, it was held that the 
word "tribunal" in the French version of this subsection has a much broader 
meaning than the word "court" used in the English version, and would 
include a police disciplinary panel. Thus, an objection to the constitution of 
that panel, on the basis that it offended section 11(d) of the Charter, could be 
made to the panel itself. In Law v. Solicitor General of Canada et al.9, it was 
held that the Immigration Appeal Board is a court of competent jurisdiction 
under the Charter, and this Board has now made its own determinations 
under the Charter 10. 
The decision of the tribunal under the Canadian Human Rights Act " in 
Kristina Potapczyk v. Alistair MacBain u held that the tribunal was vested 
with jurisdiction to determine the merits of the complaint, but was not a 
court of competent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by Mr. MacBain, or 
to determine that his rights under the Charter had been infringed. The 
tribunal stated : 
If it is a matter going to the appointment of the tribunal, then it appears that 
we are not a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 24 of 
the Charter to deal with the matter on an application, but rather it should be 
heard by the Federal Court ; however, if in the process of hearing the merits of 
the complaint, there appears to be an infringement of the Charter, than the 
tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction to consider and deal with the 
question." 
Putting the matter another way, the Ontario Divisional Court has held 
that section 24 does not create any new original jurisdiction in a court u . 
Thus, to be a "court of competent jurisdiction" under section 24, the court 
or tribunal must have, independently of the Charter, jurisdiction over the 
subject matter or general jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought. 
Going somewhat further, Gordon F. Henderson, Q.C. has suggested I5 
that section 19 of the Broadcasting Act'6 makes the CRTC a court of 
competent jurisdiction because it is a court of record ; likewise section 5 of 
the Tariff Board Act ", section 10 of the National Energy Board Actl8 and 
(1982) 70 C.C.C. (2d) 490 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.). 
(1983) 144 D.L.R. (3d) 549 (F.C.T.D.). 
See, for example, Brilo v. M.M.I., Decision No. M82-1053, July 16, 1984. 
S.C. 1976-77, c. 33. 
April 10, 1984, reported in 5 C.H.R.R., Decision No. 391, October 1984, p. D/2302. 
Id.. p. D/2303. 
Re Hussey el al. and Attorney General for Ontario el ai. (1984) 9 D.L.R. (4th) 696. 
In an address to the Canadian Bar Association, Ontario Branch, September 22, 1983, 
unpublished manuscript. 
R.S.C. 1970, c. B-ll. 
R.S.C. 1970, c. T-l. 
R.S.C. 1970, c. N-6. 
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section 6 of the National Transportation Act " for the CTC. Similarly, the 
Federal Inquiries Act20, section 5, constitutes a commission of inquiry a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 
If Mr. Henderson is correct (and I believe he is), a hypothetical 
complainant against a railway under section 15 of the Charter, alleging that 
the trains were not wheelchair accessible and, therefore, that the railway 
discriminated on the basis of physical disability, could bring the complaint 
to the Canadian Transport Commission, the Canadian Human Rights 
Commission or the Federal Court. Also, any of these three could make an 
order awarding damages, or a declaration that the complainant's Charter 
rights had been violated, or even issue an order similar to an injunction. The 
most difficult question is the scope of the remedies that may be given by a 
court of competent jurisdiction when that body is not a court of law, but has 
been vested with all of the powers of a superior court. Perhaps we will now 
begin to learn what a "superior court of record" is, or what the inherent, 
versus the statutory powers of a superior court are. This aspect of the 
Charter appears to be the heaven-sent solution to the problem of the over-
supply of lawyers in Canada. 
At a minimum, however, it will be important for lawyers both in private 
practice and in the public service to recognize that Charter rights may be 
determined by a broad range of bodies other than the traditional courts. In 
many instances, the expertise of specialized federal and provincial regulatory 
bodies may yield more sensitive Charter decisions than those likely to come 
from courts of law with concurrent jurisdiction. 
3. Search and Seizure 
The early contender for the Charter section least popular with adminis-
trators has to be section 8, which states : 
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 
Mr. Justice David C. McDonald, in his excellent book on the subject 
of administrative searches21, notes that American courts have held that 
warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, particularly for the purpose 
of administrative inspections, whether the premises searched are personal 
residences or commercial premises. Limited exceptions have been recognized 
in the case of specially regulated businesses such as the sale of firearms 
19. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17. 
20. R.S.C. 1970, c. I-13. 
21. Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Manual of Issues and 
Sources, Calgary, Carswell, 1982. 
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and liquor. Mr. Justice MacDonald suggests22 that if this reasoning 
is adopted in Canada, many federal and provincial statutes that now 
permit entries for administrative purposes without warrant would be 
held void, and such searches would be held unreasonable. 
His prophecy has proved to be correct in two areas we will consider 
below, income tax and combines. On the basis of the jurisprudence in these 
areas (the two leading cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Canada), 
it is clear that section 8 questions may be raised with respect to federal 
legislation allowing administrative searches and seizures related to fisheries, 
labour, textile labelling, hazardous products, motor vehicle safety, food and 
drugs, customs, and so on. 
3.1. Income Tax 
The leading case in this area now is Re James Richardson & Sons Limited 
and Minister of National Revenue23. The Supreme Court of Canada examined 
section 231(3) of the Income Tax Act24, which allows the Minister "for any 
purposes related to the administration or enforcement of this Act... [to] 
require from any person any information...". Under this section, the 
Minister required the appellant, a commodities futures market broker, to 
reveal the names and addresses of its customers. It is significant that, first, 
neither the appellant nor any of its particular customers were under 
investigation at the time and, second, under section 221(l)(d) of the Act, the 
Governor-in-Council is empowered to make regulations requiring "any class 
of persons to make information returns". 
The appellant brought actions for certiorari and a declaration that the 
requirement was unlawful. The actions were dismissed by both divisions of 
the Federal Court, but allowed by a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada. 
The latter held that a requirement of information under section 231(3) could 
only be made where the Minister was conducting a "genuine and serious 
inquiry into the liability of specific persons"25. This language suggests a 
judicial willingness to question the seriousness of the Minister, given that no 
one was under investigation. The court suggested, instead, that the appro-
priate conduct for the Minister was to obtain a regulation requiring that all 
traders file returns of their transactions. The court held : 
It seems to me that what the Minister is trying to do here, namely, check 
generally on compliance with the statute by traders in the commodities futures 
22. Id, p. 70. 
23. (1984)9D.L.R. (4th) 1. 
24. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63. 
25. Supra, note 23, p. 1. 
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market, cannot be done by conducting a "fishing expedition" into the affairs of 
one broker's customers under section 231(3) of the Act.26 
If there is any general conclusion one can derive from the Richardson 
case, it is that the court will condemn overly broad or needless searches. The 
traditional administrative impulse may be to try to verify everything, from 
an abundance of caution. But that may not be what the Charter contemplates. 
The philosophical thrust of Richardson is that the administration must try to 
hit the target with a rifle rather than a shotgun. The traditionally cautious, 
broad, sweeping net may satisfy the goals of bureaucratic efficiency, but that 
is not all that matters. Administrative efficiency must now be balanced 
against the private constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Any search that is wider than strictly necessary may be 
considered, prima facie, to be unreasonable. 
The acid test for the administrator should be to pose and to answer the 
question : If I put myself in the shoes of the person being searched, or whose 
goods are being seized, might I justifiably feel that the breadth or scope of 
this administrative activity is excessive ? 
It is implicit in the Richardson decision, and is seen more clearly in cases 
discussed below, that what administrative lawyers refer to as "statutory 
conditions precedent" may have an effect on judges analogous to the 
supposed effect of waving a red flag before a bull. Language like "as he 
believes may be necessary" or "he believes" is intended by administrative 
lawyers to confer a very broad discretion to do anything the statutory 
"believer" wants, subject only to the precondition to form a subjective belief. 
Prior to the Charter, such statutory conditions precedent were considered 
wonderful devices which were more subtle and more effective than privative 
clauses. Today, it would seem, the situation may have changed. 
Where the administrative response appears excessive, the tendency may 
be to second-guess the genuineness of the subjective belief. Thus, the court's 
perhaps rhetorical question in Richardson, "if the Minister seriously believes", 
suggests that the court finds it incredible that he can reasonably and 
seriously hold that view. 
Morris Manning, Q.C., in his comprehensive examination of the 
Charter11 is strongly critical of the administration of the Income Tax Act2% : 
The coming-into force of the Constitution Act, 1982, containing as it does in 
Part I the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, gives hope to those who 
26. Id., p. 9. 
27. Rights, Freedoms and the Court, Toronto, Emond-Montgomery, 1983, particularly in 
Chapter 9. 
28. Supra, note 24. 
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have long viewed with dismay the way in which the Income Tax Act of Canada 
has allowed the Minister of National Revenue and his investigative aides to put 
the burden on the taxpayer, not only to maintain records to compute the tax 
payable to the government, but also to authorize the conducting of searches 
and seizures in a way rarely countenanced by other statutes. Not only may 
there be a formal demand for information pursuant to an overly broad 
discretion, but taxpayers are required to assist in their own convictions. [...] 
The way the present scheme is administered, not only must the taxpayer 
prepare and submit at his own expense a net worth statement as a means of 
verifying whether his reporting of income over a number of years is inaccurate, 
but information is wrestled from the control of the banks about their 
customers and names of recipients of money are compelled to be divulged. The 
documents handed to accountants pertaining to their client's [sic] affairs are 
forced into the hands of the taxing authorities under threats of being charged 
with a breach of the Act if the documents are not handed over and last, but 
certainly not least, privileged information given to solicitors in the ordinary 
course of a solicitor/client relationship is forced from the solicitor into the 
hands of the taxing authorities. The demands made upon accountants and 
lawyers who advise clients with respect to tax matters raise concerns over the 
use of the powers which have been abused with impunity for many years. The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms may see an end to this broad, and 
sometimes abusive, use of power.29 
Mr. Manning's analysis of a number of cases suggests that where courts 
in the past have had to rule against the taxpayer, such as in Granby 
Construction & Equipment Limited v. Milley et al.30, the abuse of process 
found in such cases is now remediable under the Charter. 
Another important tax case, MNR et al. v. Kruger Inc. et al.31, dealt with 
a search for evidence of the violation of any provision of the Income Tax 
Act32, and the seizure and removal of documents. The majority held that 
section 8 of the Charter confines the Minister, in authorizing searches and 
seizures under section 231(4) of the Income Tax Act, to evidence relating to 
serious offences which he believes to have been committed. Certiorari was 
granted even though both parties agreed that the power of the Minister was 
purely administrative and not quasi-judicial or even subject to the rules of 
procedural fairness. The Federal Court's strongly-worded decision relied on 
the recent judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina v. Rao33, 
which dealt with warrantless searches under section 10(l)(a) of the Narcotic 
Control Act u : 
29. Supra, note 27, p. 519. 
30. [1974] C.T.C. ,562 (B.C.S.C.). 
31. [1984] C.T.C. 506(F.C.A.). 
32. Supra, note 24. 
33. (1984)46 0.R. (2d) 80. 
34. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-l. 
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Searches and seizures are intrusions into the private domain of the individual. 
They cannot be tolerated unless circumstances justify them. A search or seizure 
is unreasonable if it is unjustified in the circumstances. Section 8 does not 
merely prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. It goes further and 
guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. That 
is to say that section 8 of the Charier will be offended, not only by an 
unreasonable search or seizure or by a statute authorizing expressly a search or 
seizure without justification, but also by a statute conferring on an authority so 
wide a power of search and seizure that it leaves the individual without any 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. It is for that reason, in 
my view, that a statute authorizing searches without warrants may, as was 
decided in R. v. Rao, (supra), contravene section 8. A search without warrant 
may or may not be justified irrespective of the fact that it was made without 
warrant ; however, save in exceptional cases, a statute authorizing searches 
without warrants may be considered as offending section 8 because it deprives 
an individual of the protection that normally results from the warrant 
requirement. 
I would be ready to concede that, in certain circumstances, the fact that a 
taxpayer has committed a serious offence under the Income Tax Act may justify 
the inference that he has probably also committed other offences under the Act. 
However, I cannot accept the general proposition that the mere fact that a 
taxpayer has, at a particular time, committed an offence under the Income Tax 
Act or the regulations, however trifling that offence, affords sufficient justifi-
cation for the general power of search and seizure conferred by subsection 
231(4). In my view, that subsection violates section 8 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 in that it contravenes the right of the taxpayer "to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure".35 
In Lipsey v. MNR36, Mr. Justice Cattanach took the extraordinary step 
of granting an injunction against the Minister and certain of his employees. 
He did this because an earlier seizure of the files of the taxpayer at his and his 
solicitors' offices had been quashed by another judge of the Trial Division 
(following the Kruger case referred to above) and was still under appeal by 
the Minister when the latter authorized officers of the Department to enter 
the taxpayer's place of business to conduct an audit and to require him to 
answer questions relating to it. The injunction restrained the Minister and 
the officers from continuing their investigation and from asking the taxpayer 
questions until the appeal from the order quashing the authorization had 
been concluded. 
After saying a number of highly flattering things about the very 
distinguished taxpayer plaintiff, a world-renowned professor of economics, 
the court noted that the search had already been characterized by Mr. Justice 
Dube as a fishing trip that was unnecessary and ought not to be allowed. 
35. Supra, note 31. 
36. 84D.T.C. 6192 (F.CT.D.). 
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Cattanach J. held that this new audit was simply a different but similar 
means to stultify the order given by Mr. Justice Dube : 
More colloquially, doing something by the back door which could not be done 
by the front door.37 
Although an injunction is normally not available to preclude a public 
officer from performing a statutory duty, having accepted the plaintiffs 
argument that the posing of the questions was a subterfuge to circumvent the 
order of Dube J., the court had no difficulty in concluding that such conduct 
fell outside of statutory duties and hence would be enjoinable. 
In another recent case, Lewis v. MNR et a/.38, Mr. Justice Walsh of the 
Trial Division, following Kruger, held that a search and seizure was illegal 
under section 8 and ordered the seized documents returned to the taxpayer 
even though they might be required as evidence in subsequent proceedings. 
The Court, however, delayed the coming into effect of the order to enable 
the Crown to re-acquire possession of the documents in a legal manner. 
Whether this will ultimately result in the documents being held inadmissible 
at trial remains to be seen. 
In addition to the searches and seizures of evidence, there is the related 
issue of garnishment. Although there do not appear to be any high level 
post-Charter decisions dealing with garnishment, the virtually unlimited 
powers granted to the Minister appear to be prime candidates for section 8 
challenges, following the reasoning in Kruger. 
3.2. The Combines Investigation Act 
The most important single decision under this legislation is Hunter et al. 
and Southam Inc., released by the Supreme Court of Canada on September 17, 
198439. The decision for the unanimous Court was written by Dickson J. (as 
he then was). 
The Director of Investigation and Research of the Combines Investiga-
tion Branch instructed several officers to enter and examine documents and 
other things at the respondent's business premises in Edmonton and 
elsewhere in Canada. The authorization was certified by a member of the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission under section 10(3) of the Acti0. 
The Charter was proclaimed after the authorization was made but before the 
actual search had begun. The respondents unsuccessfully sought an interim 
37. Id, p. 6197. 
38. 84 D.T.C. 6550. 
39. (1985) 11 D.L.R. (4lh) 641. 
40. Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23. 
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injunction pending trial of the question whether the search was in violation 
of section 8. The Alberta Court of Appeal ordered all documents taken to be 
sealed on an interim basis. The reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada set out very clearly the new standard to be applied under section 8 of 
the Charter. 
Appropriate prior authorization is indispensable to a valid search, in 
the absence of special circumstances. It is not enough to determine after the 
fact that the search should not have been conducted, since the citizen would 
then have been subject to an unlawful breach of his right of privacy. 
Therefore, unless it is virtually impossible to do otherwise, warrantless 
searches are, prima facie, unreasonable. The party seeking to justify a 
warrantless search bears the onus of rebutting the presumption of unreason-
ableness. 
The search conducted in the Southam case was held to be constitutionally 
invalid for two reasons. The first was that the prior authorization was not by 
an individual who was entirely neutral and capable of acting judicially 
(although he need not be a judge). The Restrictive Trade Practices Commis-
sion has investigative and prosecutorial functions which preclude its members 
from acting in a judicial capacity since they lack the detachment necessary to 
balance the interests involved. In other words, the authorization process 
must be a real and meaningful one in which the person whose premises are 
being searched can have confidence, and not the mere formality of having 
another member of the executive branch provide an ex parte approval. 
The second reason why the authorization procedure in this case was 
deficient is that it did not meet the newly imposed stantard that there must 
be reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that 
an offence has been committed and that evidence is likely to be found at the 
place of search. 
Perhaps of greatest concern to government lawyers will be the court's 
ruling that where a statutory scheme fails to contain within it the appropriate 
standards for issuing a warrant, it is not the responsibility of the courts to fill 
in the details necessary to render the legislation constitutional. Correcting 
unconstitutional laws so as to render them constitutional is exclusively the 
role of Parliament. 
Although it is too soon to tell from this single case whether the Supreme 
Court of Canada will soften its position somewhat, the impression given by 
the Southam judgment is that legislation authorizing seemingly excessive or 
unreasonable powers of search and seizure will be strictly construed and that 
the court will neither imply safeguards nor provide detailed blueprints as to 
how the particular legislation might be corrected. 
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It is also of some significance that the forecast in Mr. Justice Mac-
Donald's book41 that our courts would follow U.S. cases dealing with search 
and seizure was demonstrated to be accurate, at least by the judgment in 
Southam. It is not that particular U.S. cases were cited as precedents. Rather, 
the line of reasoning which appealed to the court was extracted from a 
number of U.S. cases. Central to the court's reasoning was the posing to 
itself of three important questions underlying the issue of the act of 
balancing the citizen's interest in being left alone by government with the 
government's interest in intruding on his privacy in order to enforce its laws. 
3.2.1. When is the Balance of Interests to be Assessed ? 
Since the purpose of section 8 is to protect individuals by preventing 
unjustified searches before they happen, the constitutional intention can 
only be accomplished by a system of prior authorization. This demonstrates 
that the question of timing is central to an examination of these Charter 
rights. Although the Act in question42 did have a system of prior authoriza-
tion, the Cour then addressed whether section 10(3) provided for an 
acceptable authorization procedure. 
3.2.2. Who must Grant the Authorization ? 
The Court was willing to acknowledge that it was not a necessary 
precondition to have all prior authorizations issued by judicial officers. 
Nevertheless, it did suggest a strong preference when it cited with approval 
the recent English case of I.R.C. v. Rossminster43, in which Viscount 
Dilhorne stated44 that the power to authorize administrative searches and 
seizures should be given to a "more senior judge". Our Court commented 
that this "may be wise"45. 
In a critique which may apply, mutatis mutandis, to a variety of 
authorization processes, the Court stated : 
the administrative nature of the Commission's investigative duties [...] ill 
accords with the neutrality and detachment necessary to assess whether the 
evidence reveals that the point has been reached where the interests of the 
individual must constitutionally give way to those of the state. A member of 
the R.T.P.C. [...] simply cannot be the impartial arbiter necessary to grant an 
effective authorization.46 
41. Supra, note 21. 
42. Supra, note 40. 
43. [1980] 1 All ER. 80. 
44. Id, p. 87. 
45. Hunter et al. and Southam Inc., supra, note 39, at p. 654. 
46. Id., p. 656. 
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3.2.3. On What Basis must the Balance of Interests be Assessed? 
T h e C o u r t ' s r e a s o n s u n d e r this p a r t of its j u d g m e n t a re p r o b a b l y the 
m o s t genera l ly a p p l i c a b l e . A large n u m b e r of federal s t a tu tes c o n t a i n 
subject ive c o n d i t i o n s p receden t , of which the C o u r t was s o m e w h a t cri t ical . 
As Prowse J. A. pointed out, if the powers of a Commission member are as the 
Federal Court of Appeal found them to be, then it follows that the decision of 
the Director in the course of an inquiry to exercise his powers of entry, search 
and seizure, is effectively unreviewable. The extent of the privacy of the 
individual would be left to the discretion of the Director. A provision 
authorizing such an unreviewable power would clearly be inconsistent with 
section 8 of the Charter.47 
T h e r e is , poss ib ly , an a n a l o g y which m a y be d r a w n be tween this 
r e a s o n i n g a n d the rationes of some of the recent sect ion 96 cases such as 
Crevier v. A. G. Quebec48 a n d A. G Quebec v. Farrah49. Ju s t as n a t u r e a b h o r s 
a v a c u u m , the cou r t s a b h o r t r ench ing u p o n super io r cou r t func t ions in a n 
a t t e m p t t o c rea te effectively un rev iewab le p o w e r s . G o i n g even fur ther , t he 
j u d g m e n t s t a t ed , obiter : 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Federal Court of Appeal was wrong, and the 
member is authorized, or even required, to satisfy himself as to (1) the legality 
of the inquiry and (2) the reasonableness of the Director's belief that there may 
be evidence relevant to the matters being inquired into, would that remove the 
inconsistency with section 8 ? 
To read s. 10(1) and 10(3) as simply allowing the authorizing party to satisfy 
himself on these questions, without requiring him to do so, would in my view 
be clearly inadequate. Such an amorphous standard cannot provide a meaning-
ful criterion for securing the right guaranteed by section 8. The location of the 
constitutional balance between a justifiable expectation of privacy and the 
legitimate needs of the state cannot depend on the subjective appreciation of 
individual adjudicators. Some objective standard must be established. 
Requiring the authorizing party to satisfy himself as to the legality of the 
inquiry and the reasonableness of the Director's belief in the possible existence 
of relevant evidence, would have the advantage of substituting an objective 
standard for an amorphous one, but would, in my view, still be inadequate. 
The problem is with the stipulation of a reasonable belief that evidence may be 
uncovered in the search. Here again, it is useful, in my view, to adopt a 
purposive approach. The purpose of an objective criterion for granting prior 
authorization to conduct a search or seizure is to provide a consistent standard 
for identifying the point at which the interests of the State in such intrusions 
come to prevail over the interests of the individual in resisting them. To 
associate it with an applicant's reasonable belief that relevant evidence may be 
uncovered by the search would be to define the proper standard as the 
47. Id, p. 657. 
48. [1981]2S.C.R. 220. 
49. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 638. 
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possibility of finding evidence. This is a very low standard which would validate 
intrusion on the basis of suspicion, and authorize fishing expeditions of 
considerable latitude. It would tip the balance strongly in favour of the State 
and limit the right of the individual to resist to only the most egregious 
intrusions. I do not believe that this is a proper standard for securing the right 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.50 
Without wishing to read too much into this very important judgment, 
two observations might be made. First, this case, like several others, uses the 
words "fishing expedition". The clear implication is that someone requesting 
authorization for a search must be able to demonstrate (under oath, to an 
impartial adjudicator) first, that he has a fairly clear idea of what he is 
looking for, and second, that he has a strong reason to believe that 
something pointing to an offence will probably be found there. Mere 
intuition or hunch is not enough. 
To be able to attest to this in an affidavit, the deponent must provide 
sufficient particulars from which the arbiter between the interests of the 
citizen and the state can assess the reasonableness of the belief. In other 
words, the affidavit should state why the deponent has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that there is more than a mere possibility that 
relevant evidence will be found if a search or seizure is conducted. To take 
any other view would be to assume that the court in Southam has done 
nothing but give advice as to how to swear technically correct affidavits. 
Surely that is too cynical an approach. 
Since affidavits of this sort are usually presented to a judge ex parte, 
because he cannot himself cross-examine the deponent there should be 
sufficient information in the affidavit to enable the judge to satisfy himself 
that what is sought is not a fishing trip but is based on a substantial 
likelihood that relevant evidence will be found. 
The Court recognized a special exception in security cases : 
Where the State's interest is not simply law enforcement as, for instance, where 
State security is involved, or where the individual's interest is not simply his 
expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily 
integrity, the relevant standard might well be a different one.5' 
It remains to be seen, however, how the court will respond to cases where 
state security is involved. 
50. Supra, note 45, p. 657-658. 
51. Id., p. 659. 
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3.3. Immigration 
The security issue arises in a number of immigration cases in which 
persons claiming to be refugees may be deported to countries where, it is 
asserted, the individual may be tortured or killed for political reasons. If the 
Minister has information suggesting that the individual has a criminal 
record, or is for some reason a risk to our national security, he may resist 
releasing that information for fear of disclosing the identities of informants. 
Obviously, this requires a delicate balancing of the principle of fairness to 
the individual — providing him with an opportunity to know of what he is 
accused and to make a reply thereto — and the effectiveness of law 
enforcement in Canada and the other country. 
An early decision of the Immigration Appeal Board52 held that such a 
deportation is not a violation of the Charter because the state's interest in 
withholding such information from foreigners outweighs the latter's interest 
in disclosure. A group of cases of Sikh complainants [styled Singh v. 
M.M.I.53] has now been heard by the Supreme Court, but as of the date of 
this writing, the decision has not yet been released. These cases are somewhat 
different from Brito54 in their fact situations but the court may use the 
opportunity to explain how the conflicting interests can be resolved with the 
least intrusion upon the rights of the individual. To indulge in a bit of 
speculation, it may be a possibility that the court will look for some halfway 
house between the two extremes, perhaps by analogy to some of the cases 
involving the Anti-Dumping Tribunal [now the Canadian Import Tribunal]. 
A good example of such a case is Magnasonic Can. Ltd. v. Anti-Dumping 
Tribunal^, in which it was held that, although the details of evidence taken 
in confidence during an in camera hearing could not be disclosed, a 
reasonable summary thereof could be made and provided to the parties 
whose interests were affected. In the immigration context, it may be possible 
in some cases, although perhaps not in all, to disclose a summary of the 
information without thereby revealing, for example, the identity of the 
informant. It may then be possible for the immigrant to demonstrate, 
through his own evidence, that these allegations made against him are 
untrue. 
Additionally, or alternatively, it may be possible to disclose the 
confidential information to a judge, to determine whether it has sufficient 
52. Supra, note 10. 
53. All seven are styled Singh v. M.M.I. 
54. Supra, note 10. 
55. [1972] F.C. 1239 (F.C.A.). See also Sarco Canada Ltd. v. A.D.T., [1979] 1 F.C. 247 (F.C.A.) 
and Brunswick v. A.D.T., (1979) 108 D.L.R. (3d) 216 (F.C.A.). 
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probative value, and whether it should be disclosed to the individual. This 
would enable someone outside the administration and an obviously impartial 
arbiter to adjudicate the conflicting interests involved and to ensure that the 
immigrant's rights are given their proper weight. These are the kinds of 
delicate compromises which may be necessitated by the Charter. 
3.4. Other Statutes 
There is a large number of statutes which authorize administrative 
practices which may offend the Charter. There is insufficient space to 
consider them all, but prime candidates would include anything containing a 
reverse onus clause or a right to search and seize. Generically, this would 
cover at least narcotics, prison law, immigration, income tax, shipping, 
fisheries, weights and measures, metrication, food and drugs, hazardous 
products, customs, motor vehicle safety, textile labelling, and safety services 
under the Canada Labour Code.56 
[In addition to the major area of searches and seizures, consideration 
must be given to statutory provisions or administrative practices which may 
be discriminatory. These might include mandatory retirement provisions in 
the public service, certain deprivations of civil status found in the Judges 
ActS7, maternity provisions under various kinds of legislation, notably 
unemployment insurance, and so on.] 
Let us consider two hypothetical scenarios to illustrate these points. 
First, let us assume that this month's issue of a SlOforeign art magazine has 
on its cover a photograph of the painting of Venus by Botticelli. Since it 
portrays female sexual organs which may be contrary to the customs 
guidelines58, which expressly caution against pornography masquerading as 
artistic materials, all copies of the issue are seized at the border and shipped 
to Ottawa for further assessment. By the time senior officials in Ottawa 
finally get around to deciding that it is a legitimate art magazine, several 
months have gone by, and retailers will no longer stock a magazine that is 
three months out-of-date. The importer has to scrap them all. He then sues 
56. Within provincial jurisdiction, an interesting application of the reasoning in Southam, 
supra, note 39, covered the seizure of movie projector and film under s. 4(2)(e) of 
Ontario's Theatres Act, R.S.O. 1980 c. 498, in Nightengale Galleries Ltd. v. Director of 
Theatres Branch, (1985) 48 O.R. (2d) 21. The Court held (at p. 30) that although the action 
of the seizing officials was reasonable the legislation permitting it was not appropriate 
under the Charter, hence the enabling law was ultra vires and so was the seizure. The 
reasonableness of the conduct was, therefore, irrelevant. 
57. R.S.C. 1970, c. J-l. 
58. Department Memorandum D9-1-1 and Policy Guidelines. 
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for a declaration that the publication in question was not obscene and that 
his Charter rights were violated. The judge, being an art fan, grants the 
declaration and also, pursuant to section 24, awards damages against the 
Crown equal to the plaintiffs pecuniary loss. 
To make matters worse, a group of irate TAor^on-inspired taxpayers 
brings an action against the individual customs officers and the officials in 
Ottawa, seeking to have them pay this loss personally. They argue that no 
legislation can protect public servants from the responsibility for violations 
of the liberties of the citizenry because such gross violation of the consti-
tutional rights of Canadians is not part of the course of employment of any 
public servant, and the public officials involved were on a "frolic of their 
own". 
This scenario may be a bit farfetched, but it underlines the anomaly of 
allowing customs officials in the field or in Ottawa to make what may, for all 
practical purposes, be ex parte final decisions about obscenity in the case of 
imported publications while the vendors of similar publications printed in 
Canada are protected by the full range of safeguards found in criminal 
procedure before a judge. Caution would suggest the development of a 
procedure whereby a customs officer would refer such a question to a court 
as expeditiously as possible so that the citizen may have his rights adjudicated 
by means of an adversary process applying a presumption of innocence. 
As our second scenario, consider a search and seizure under section 8 of 
the Textile Labelling Act59. This Act allows an inspector to enter any 
premises in which he reasonably believes there is any textile fibre product, in 
order to conduct a physical examination or audit of books and records. 
Under section 10(1) of the Act, whenever an inspector believes on reasonable 
grounds that any provision of the Act or regulations has been violated, he 
may seize any textile fibre product or any labelling, packaging or advertising 
material by which he believes the violation was committed. He may detain 
these products until : 
a) in the inspector's opinion, the provisions of the Act or regulations 
have been complied with ; or 
b) the expiration of ninety days or such other longer period as may be 
prescribed [by persons unspecified but, presumably the allusion is to 
regulations], unless before that time proceedings have been instituted, 
in which event the material seized may be detained until the 
proceedings are finally concluded [quaere whether this means that all 
appeals have been finally concluded]. 
59. R.S.C. 1970, c. 46. 
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The inspector's seizing samples and rushing off to a judge to obtain an 
injunction (or other appropriate order) would be uncontroversial. But the 
power to seize such goods in their entirety, and to retain them, perhaps until 
their commercial value is lost, in the absence of any clear emergency or 
danger to public health or safety, is questionable60. Potentially, such a 
seizure could amount to an expropriation. It is also interesting to note that 
the inspector — who probably has no formal legal training — is required to 
form an opinion of the Act and the regulations almost as would a judge, and 
the responsibility is shifted to the owner of the goods to try to obtain some 
timely judicial redress for what, for all practical purposes, might amount to 
an unreviewable opinion. 
Conclusion 
As indicated at the outset, the Charter is still in its infancy, and the 
Charter decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada relating to administrative 
law are few. The message for administrators, however, is already becoming 
clear. Three broad conclusions emerge. 
1. The Charter must be taken seriously by administrators who, to date, 
may have had little, if any experience with the judicial process. It must be 
regarded as a limitation upon every administrative action and every statutory 
instrument. It has "constitutionalized" administrative law, procedure and 
practice. 
There is no point in being irritated about it because it reduces 
administrative efficiency : that was precisely what it was intended to do. If 
the administration thinks that something is "reasonably justified", it must be 
prepared not merely to assert it, but to prove it. Gone are the days when one 
can simply say, "Trust us, we are the public service". 
As the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the role of 
government lawyers is not always to oppose the Charter. There is a higher 
responsibility : to the country as a whole. The message that government 
lawyers must take to the rest of the bureaucracy is that the age of broad 
discretion has been replaced by the new regime of legality. Statutory powers 
do not merely exist to shield the bureaucracy ; the Charter has been super-
imposed to create a new balance, to protect the individual from the 
60. In Nightengale Galleries, supra, note 56, the Court upheld (at p. 33) a different standard 
between a warrantless search and seizure of, for example, tainted poultry and printed 
materials : 
It is much easier to justify a warrantless seizure and quarantine of products which could 
constitute a health hazard to the population than a similar encroachment on a 
fundamental freedom. 
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unfortunately inevitable occasional excesses of mass government. The more 
quickly Crown lawyers absorb this and educate their clients, the less the 
likelihood that a court will find it necessary to wreak havoc with a carefully 
crafted regulatory scheme on a Friday afternoon. 
2. The bureaucracy must learn to exercise no more power than is 
absolutely indispensable to achieve the legislature's purpose. It must learn, 
by a newly acquired reflex, to balance automatically the dictates of 
bureaucratic efficiency with the right of the citizen to be left alone. 
Draconian measures intended to deal with extreme cases must not be 
considered to be the norm. 
3. As is often the case, an administrative scheme will deal with a broad 
array of heterogeneous situations. For example, the Hazardous Products 
Act61 may cover relatively long-term hazards such as urea formaldehyde 
foam insulation and, also, dangerous poisons. A single set of powers 
designed to cover the worst possible situation will probably create a 
problem62 in the many less serious cases. Rather than legislating the most 
intrusive powers for all situations, the law should provide a range of 
responses, each tailored to the relative severity of the threat to the public. 
More serious intrusions into citizens' liberties should be reserved for more 
serious circumstances. Sometimes in modern legal design, as in architecture, 
less is more. 
61. R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3. 
62. Of the sort encountered in Nightengale Galleries, supra, note 56. 
